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Research Summary: Building on the communications
and linguistics literatures, we explore the language attri-
butes managers use in interactions with investors and the
subsequent reactions of investors. Specifically, we
hypothesize that top managers’ use of concrete language
attributes in communication with investors broadly asso-
ciates with positive investor reactions. We further posit
that this relationship will be moderated by the level of
firm risk. Our results support our hypotheses and, thus,
offer important insights to the impression management
literature. First, subtle elements of managerial communi-
cation can have significant impression management con-
sequences. More specifically, language concreteness is a
key language attribute that generally induces positive
investor responses. Finally, the effectiveness of language
concreteness is conditional on the informational environ-
ment of the firm.
Managerial Summary: How can managers communicate
in a way that presents the firm more positively or reduces
the negativity associated with perceived firm risks? Our
findings indicate that choosing appropriate persuasive
language features in interactions with investors can help a
firm manage its impressions. Specifically, we find that
top managers’ use of concrete language that provides
details and specific information in communication with
investors, in general, garners positive investor reactions.
Further, the effectiveness of top managers’ use of con-
crete language depends on investor concerns. More spe-
cifically, we find that when a firm is seen as having a
riskier profile, using concrete language helps induce a
more positive investor response; while when a firm is
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seen as low risk, using abstract language may be more
beneficial.
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concrete language, firm risk, investor response, top
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Impression management (IM) research has provided useful insights regarding the tactics top man-
agers use to influence external stakeholders’ perceptions (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap,
2008). Tactics examined in prior IM research include how managers: (a) Select news release media
that positively represent the firm (Washburn & Bromiley, 2014); (b) Strategize timing of the release
of confounding information, in order to reduce negative interpretations of a focal event (Graffin,
Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011; Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016), and, (c) Signal firm legitimacy by
conforming to expected corporate conduct and governance structures (Westphal & Graebner, 2010;
Westphal & Zajac, 1998). In addition, prior studies have explored when and how top managers use
specific content to explain or justify firms’ activities and qualities to avoid harm to their firms’
images (Elsbach, 2003; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). Examples include internal-
external attributions (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983), obfuscation (Li, 2008), and discretionary
disclosure strategies (Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, & Nemec, 2004; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007).
Research findings show these tactics tend to assuage stakeholders’ concerns.
Despite these rich insights, however, the IM literature has tended to focus on the content of mes-
sages, leaving the persuasive language attributes that may be embedded in top managers’ communi-
cation fairly unexplored. Language attributes are reflected in the types and frequencies of words top
managers employ, such as the inclusion of complex words or personal pronouns. A significant
amount of prior work in the communications literature shows that language attributes are an effec-
tive tool for managing audiences’ impressions because they influence the quality of message deliv-
ery (Bradac, Bowers, & Courtright, 1979; Larrimore, Jiang, Larrimore, Markowitz, & Gorski, 2011;
Toma & D’Angelo, 2015). This literature suggests one form of language attributes—language
concreteness—may be a particularly relevant IM tool for top managers who are attempting to offer a
persuasive message to investors about their firm’s performance, strategic plans, and future prospects.
Concrete language refers to descriptive words that provide specific information and entail context-
specific, detailed descriptions of situations (Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Langacker, 1987). In this
study, we examine whether and under what conditions top managers’ use of concrete language dur-
ing earnings calls is associated with positive investor reactions.
Concrete language contains commonly used words to provide adequate details and context-
specific information. Research has shown that the use of such language facilitates listeners’ informa-
tion processing and recall and enhances their confidence in speakers’ decisions, thereby increasing
their perceptions of speaker expertise. Consequently, concrete language enhances message persua-
siveness, or the degree to which messages shape listeners’ subsequent attitudes and behaviors
(Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Larrimore et al., 2011; Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007;
Toma & D’Angelo, 2015). Consistent with prior research, we expect that managers’ use of concrete
language increases the persuasiveness of their communication and, thus, generates positive investor
reactions.
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In terms of effectiveness, concrete language has also generally been shown to be more beneficial in
settings in which the salience of downside risk is high (Larrimore et al., 2011; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015).
Turning to the corporate setting, we focus on two risk factors that enhance the salience of such risk. Spe-
cifically, these factors are (a) missed earnings—a dynamic risk factor that raises concerns about the ability
of the firm to weather a period of underperforming market expectations, and (b) risky financial profiles—
a more stable risk factor that increases concerns that the firm may lack the ability to exploit market oppor-
tunities or withstand an unexpected market shock. When such conditions emerge, investors likely scruti-
nize the firm more carefully and require additional reassurance regarding the company and its leadership
(Afifi & Weiner, 2004; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Kramer, 1999). Accordingly, we expect that concrete
language is especially beneficial in high downside risk situations since it enables speakers to provide ade-
quate specificity to address investors’ information needs, thereby reducing their uncertainty and increas-
ing the probability they will evaluate the information more positively (Doest, Semin, & Sherman, 2002).
Earning calls are an ideal context to examine whether and how managers’ use of concrete language
influences investor reactions. Communicating with investors is an important aspect of corporate leader-
ship (Pfeffer, 1981; Selznick, 1957). Due to information asymmetries, investors have incomplete access
to firm information. These informational voids provide opportunities for top managers to communicate in
ways that can influence investors’ perceptions (Graffin et al., 2011; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). Cor-
porate communication events, such as quarterly earnings calls, offer top managers a particularly salient
opportunity to convince investors that their firms are well-positioned and capably managed. Further,
because earnings calls are voluntary, managers have significant latitude to present information in the way
they believe will best lead to positive investor reactions (Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 2011).
Our study draws on the communications and linguistics literatures to examine top manager’s use of
concrete language during earnings call events and its influence on investors’ responses. In doing so, our
study offers two contributions. First, IM is inherently a communication process, and while organiza-
tional IM studies have been concerned with the contentmanagers should include in their communication
efforts (see review by Bolino et al., 2008), such as accounts, apologies, justifications, or excuses, this
work has not yet expanded to include language attributes, which are a more elemental form of communi-
cation (Bozeman & Kacmar, 1997). We add to this literature by showing that specific language attri-
butes embedded in managers’ communication can influence investors’ responses to earnings calls.
Specifically, we demonstrate that managers can leverage language attributes to assuage investors’ con-
cerns and “minimize bad” outcomes (Bolino et al., 2008). This finding extends the IM literature by
introducing a novel linguistic perspective that provides a deeper understanding of the influence of top
managers’ communication on a critically important organizational outcome. Second, we examine condi-
tions in which concrete language is more or less beneficial in generating positive investor reactions. In
particular, we focus on factors that influence the salience of downside firm risk and show that while con-
crete language generally induces positive responses, this effect is stronger under conditions of higher
downside risk. Nevertheless, we also find that when firm downside risk is low, non-concrete (abstract)
language may be a more beneficial IM tactic. In sum, our results show that the effectiveness of language
attributes in leaving positive impressions on investors is contingent on firms’ specific situations.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Concrete language and investor reactions
Through research on the manner in which an actor can “create, maintain, protect, or otherwise alter
an image held by target audience” (Bolino et al., 2008), IM scholars have implicitly devoted
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significant attention to the content of the communication top managers deliver to target audiences
(e.g., apologies, burying, excuses, justifications). Although this research has offered substantial insight
into the IM approaches inherent in managerial messages, communications research suggests that the
IM literature is missing a key element regarding how communication influences audience assessments.
Communications scholars have highlighted that above and beyond content, the specific language attri-
butes embedded in messages also influence audience perceptions and evaluations of speakers and their
messages (Bradac et al., 1979; Miller et al., 2007; Pornpitakpan, 2004) and, thus, the persuasiveness of
their communication (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Wood, 2000).
Language attributes encompass almost every aspect of language including its sound system (pho-
nology), rules and structure of sentences (syntax), and words (lexicon) (Bradac et al., 1979; Hosman,
2002). We focus our study on the attributes of the words used because they are the fundamental unit
of language, and play an important role in whether or not audiences find speakers’ overall messages
persuasive (Berry, Pennebaker, Mueller, & Hiller, 1997; Semin, 2008). Words can be organized and
arranged to form any higher-level unit of language units such as phrases, sentences, and paragraphs.
Even when two messages contain very similar content, their effectiveness may vary based on the spe-
cific words used (Pennebaker & King, 1999). Such variation not only reveals important information
about the communicator and the subject (Pennebaker, 1993; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996), but also
affects the different inferences audiences make, which in turn influences both their evaluations of mes-
sages and subsequent responses (Berry et al., 1997; Parkinson, 1981; Sherblom & Reinsch, 1981).
Although prior communications and linguistics research has introduced a number of commonly
observed language attributes associated with words, such as their diversity, intensity, and concrete-
ness (Anderson & Blackburn, 2004; Bradac et al., 1979; Hosman, 2002; Miller et al., 2007), the IM
literature has not yet examined the role these subtle language attributes play in managerial commu-
nication. Thus, to extend the IM literature, we draw on prior work on a critical language attribute
that has been shown to influence the persuasiveness of a message: language concreteness. This lan-
guage attribute has been shown to influence message persuasiveness, which in turn affects audi-
ences’ behaviors through cognitive mechanisms such as enhanced comprehension and message
recall (Doest & Semin, 2005; Larrimore et al., 2011). Concrete language receives particularly favor-
able reactions when audience members have asymmetric information (less relative to speakers) and
when uncertainty is present (Larrimore et al., 2011; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015). In the corporate con-
text, the prevalence of information asymmetries causes investors to suffer from information deficien-
cies, which increase their uncertainty about the current performance and future prospects of the
firms in which they invest. Accordingly, drawing from the communications and linguistics litera-
tures, we explore how the level of concreteness in managers’ language during earnings calls influ-
ences investors’ subsequent responses.
Language concreteness reflects the degree to which the words used in a message provide details
and contextualization of information. The linguistics literature has long established the significance
of concrete language in human learning and information processing (Bleasdale, 1987; Paivio, 1963;
Semin, 2008; Tse & Altarriba, 2009). Scholars have increasingly investigated its influence on per-
suasion, which has particular relevance to IM. Broadly, findings from this literature show that in
most circumstances, messages with concrete language are more persuasive, as compared to mes-
sages that use abstract language (Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Larrimore et al., 2011; Toma & D’An-
gelo, 2015).1 Prior research has suggested three reasons why concrete language increases the
persuasiveness of communications (Doest et al., 2002). First, concrete language contributes to two
1We should note that there are clear instances in which abstract language is well received. We elaborate on such contexts in our sec-
ond set of hypotheses.
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conditions that enhance message persuasiveness: audiences’ sense of familiarity with the information
and the ease with which they can understand the message (Baesler, 1997; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979;
Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988). Along these lines, concrete language requires the use
of high frequency words and clear descriptions, which enable an audience’s sense of familiarity when
processing a message (Miller et al., 2007; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015). Moreover, research has shown
that the contextualized and detailed explanation of the subject presented in concrete language is easy
to process and understand (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985). Thus, in general, concrete language
invokes positive responses from audience members and encourages them to accept the messages that
speakers deliver (Miller et al., 2007; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015).
Second, concrete language improves the accessibility of information to audience members, which
is also conducive to message persuasiveness (Forgas, 2007; Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991; Paivio,
Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015; Wood, 1982). The persuasion literature suggests
that messages have greater influence on audiences’ evaluations and judgments when they are readily
available and easily retrievable (Wood, 1982). The rich details and context-specific information pro-
vided by concrete language make messages both more interesting and memorable. Thus, in general,
because messages composed of concrete language are promptly accessible, they have greater influence
on listeners than less concrete messages, so they are more persuasive (Estes, 1982; Sadoski, 2001).
Third, generally, communicators who use concrete language are more persuasive and favorably
evaluated because they are perceived as more competent and trustworthy, compared to those who
use abstract language (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Larrimore et al., 2011; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015).
Further, communicators are viewed as especially competent when their messages are clear and
understandable (Miller et al., 2007; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015). Moreover, by providing details and
showing proficient understanding of the subject, communicators are regarded as knowledgeable
(Larrimore et al., 2011; Toma & Hancock, 2012). Messages delivered by competent and knowledge-
able speakers generally are evaluated favorably, thus their communication tends to be persuasive
(Hansen & Wänke, 2010; Miller et al., 2007; Toma & D’Angelo, 2015; Toma & Hancock, 2012).
The logic presented above is appropriate for our context of earnings conference calls, in which
top managers communicate voluntarily with the investor community. In such settings, investors look
to managers to reduce information asymmetry and assuage their concerns about firms’ market posi-
tions and their leaders’ capabilities (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001). In the context of
earnings calls, an example of a high concreteness statement that is more likely to reduce information
asymmetry is: “Our gross profit increased 8% to $20.2 million from $18.7 million because we have
launched five new products and opened 50 new stores nationwide”. By contrast, an example of a
statement low on concreteness that might not be as effective at reducing information asymmetry is:
“We expect to do better this year because of actions we’re taking to grow the firm.” By providing
situational details for current performance and future plans in an understandable manner, we expect
the use of concrete language to be beneficial for investor responses, because doing so enhances the
persuasiveness of the managers’ statements and lessens the degree to which those investors perceive
the need to further scrutinize the firm and its leadership.
By demonstrating their ability to clearly communicate specifics about a firm’s performance and
its operating environment, top managers who use concrete language enhance the confidence inves-
tors have in them, thus encouraging investors to assess the firm favorably. Therefore, we hypothe-
size that,
Hypothesis 1 (H1) The level of language concreteness in top managers’ communica-
tion is positively related to investor reactions.
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2.2 | Concrete language, abstract language, and risk conditions
We further argue that concrete language will be especially beneficial when downside risk is more
salient. We base our logic on the following three arguments derived from the communications and
linguistics literatures. First, concrete language will attenuate concerns about downside potential. As
risk increases, individuals become more skeptical and uncertain (Cohen, Jaffray, & Said, 1987) and
search for additional information to understand both the causes and potential consequences of the
heightened risk and make predictions about future outcomes (Afifi & Weiner, 2004; Babrow, 2001;
Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Kramer, 1999). Communications research suggests that when individuals
feel heightened doubt or uncertainty, the descriptive explanations and specific details provided by
concrete language can reduce their skepticism and questions (Doest et al., 2002). Therefore, in situa-
tions in which downside potential is salient, information that uses concrete language reduces pessi-
mism and is favorably evaluated by the audience.
Second, the communications and linguistics literatures have shown that when individuals per-
ceive a high level of downside risk, they typically experience cognitive stress, which invokes nega-
tive responses (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Owayne & Rheenen, 1984; Rozin & Royzman, 2001;
Wright, 1974). Concrete language is more effective than abstract language at reducing cognitive
stress as it provides information that is easy to understand, extract, and process (Elsbach, 2004).
These attributes are especially beneficial when trying to reduce the cognitive stress associated with
high-risk situations. In addition, by providing information that is more specific and less ambiguous,
concrete language mitigates the rise of additional uncertainty (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2003). Thus,
because concrete language is less cognitively demanding, audience members will feel less stress pro-
cessing the information and making decisions. As a result, concrete language is more likely to evoke
favorable responses than abstract language (Sadoski, 2001).
Finally, the communications and linguistics literatures have also shown that concrete language
increases individuals’ confidence when making decisions in uncertain contexts. For example, in a lend-
ing context, Larrimore et al. (2011) found that concrete language reduced uncertainty by providing spe-
cific information about sources. Specifically, when potential borrowers used concrete language in
order to provide detailed information about themselves, lenders placed higher confidence in their own
comprehension and evaluation of repayment likelihood and, thus, were more likely to invest. There-
fore, when presented with information delivered with concrete language, audience members tend to
experience enhanced confidence in their risk evaluations. Together this research suggests that concrete
language bolsters audience members’ confidence and, thereby, assuages their downside risk concerns.
As a result, they perceive less downside threats and tend to evaluate those situations more favorably.
Although in general, concrete language is more beneficial than abstract (non-concrete) language
in top managers’ communications, instances exist in which abstract language is less likely to trigger
a negative reaction and may actually be advantageous. For example, communications and linguistics
research has shown that in favorable and low-risk situations, abstract language tends to generate
positive audience assessments. Abstract language may lead to positive reactions in such situations
for three reasons. First, the persuasive benefits associated with concrete language are less valued in
positive situations because audience members perceive little need to be persuaded. Second, research
on the inferences audience members draw from communications (Eagly & Chaiken, 1984; Eagly,
Wood, & Chaiken, 1978) suggests when a current situation is favorable and involves limited risk,
the use of abstract language leads listeners to infer the situation is stable and will remain consistent
in the near future (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000, 2006). Third, lis-
teners make inferences about a speaker’s attitude toward the subject of communication based on the
language attributes s/he uses (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Vonk, 1998, 2002). Prior studies suggest
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that when a speaker uses abstract language, listeners presume the speaker holds a positive attitude
toward the subject of discussion (Fox & Amichai-Hamburger, 2001; Pallak, Murroni, & Koch,
1983). Specifically, the use of abstract language suggests the speaker believes the current situation
will persist. Thus, when they use abstract language, audiences infer speakers are certain and confi-
dent about the subject under discussion, reinforcing their view that potential risk associated with the
situation is low and will remain low (Douglas & Sutton, 2006).
In our context, we focus on the effectiveness of concrete versus abstract language under two fac-
tors associated with firm risk—one more dynamic and the other more stable. We examine the two
conditions because investors are likely to assess not only managers’ communication about current
episodic risks but also longer-term and more stable risks. To capture each type of risk, we examine
situations when firms’ quarterly earnings fail to meet expectations (i.e., large negative earnings sur-
prises) and when they have risky financial profiles (i.e., high debt-to-equity ratio). A negative earn-
ings surprise is a firm event that increases the salience of downside risk potential for investors.
When investors’ expectations are not met, they tend to immediately reduce the firm’s valuation and
question its long-term growth and profitability prospects (Barron, Byard, & Yu, 2008; Brown, 2001;
Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2004). Thus, when a firm reports a negative earnings surprise, investors
often focus on reasons the firm may continue to underperform expectations. The firm’s financial risk
profile also has an influence on the resources available to the firm and the degree of its debt obliga-
tions. When a firm incurs significant debt burdens and becomes highly leveraged, it becomes less
flexible. As a result, the potential for future downside threats is enhanced, because the firm is
viewed as both less able to exploit opportunities and more vulnerable to actions by rivals or external
environmental shifts (Opler & Titman, 1994).
During earnings conference calls, concrete language allows top managers to explain and justify,
in detail, their firms’ performance, positioning, and challenges when the firms’ downside risk is
high. Moreover, concrete language may reduce investors’ stress in processing information under
uncertainty and boost their confidence when evaluating firms and making their investment decisions.
Accordingly, we expect that concrete language elicits favorable evaluations toward top managers
and their messages in the face of heightened downside risk. Therefore, we propose the value of con-
crete language for investors’ responses will be greater in high downside risk situations.
In contrast, we propose that because abstract language will motivate listeners to conclude that
the current situation is stable and persistent (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Wigboldus et al., 2000, 2006),
it may result in positive reactions in lower downside risk contexts. In addition, when managers use
abstract language in low-risk situations, investors tend to infer those managers are confident and
positive about their firm’s strategic situation and future prospects. Therefore, abstract language is
unlikely to trigger negative investor reactions in low-risk situations as it does in high-risk situations,
and may even generate positive reactions under low firm risk.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a) The magnitude of the firm’s earnings surprise will moderate the
relationship between language concreteness in top managers’ communication and
investors’ reactions, with concrete language triggering a more positive reaction when
a firm has a large negative earnings surprise.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b) The level of the firm’s financial risk will moderate the relation-
ship between language concreteness in top managers’ communication and investors’
reactions, with concrete language triggering a more positive reaction when a firm has
high financial risk.
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3 | METHODS
3.1 | Sample and data
We used quarterly earnings conference call transcripts to examine top managers’ communication
with investors. Since firms carefully prepare earnings conference call presentations before the
announcement, transcripts of the presentations provide an unobtrusive measure of top managers’
language use (Lee, 2015).
To test our hypotheses, we started with a sample of 500 randomly selected firms from Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) 1,500 in 2013. We collected quarterly earnings conference call transcripts from
2007 to 2013 from the Seeking Alpha website. The time frame includes both ups and downs of the
economy, which allows us to examine top managers’ language across diverse economic outlooks,
increasing our data generalizability (Brunnermeier, 2009). We collected firm financial data from
several sources including Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S), the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP), and COMPUSTAT. In addition, we collected abnormal returns data from
the Eventus in Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). Our final sample consisted of 388 firms,
spread over 183 industries, which yielded 6,400 observations.
3.2 | Dependent variable
Following prior research in the finance and strategy literatures, we examine the impact of language
on investors’ assessment of firm value using an event study methodology (Kothari & Warner, 2007;
MacKinlay, 1997). The importance of an event may be assessed by the security’s price change dur-
ing a period surrounding the event. This price change is called an abnormal return and is calculated
as the difference between the observed return for a security and the predicted or normal return for
the same security (Fama, 1991; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Thus, the impact of an event is mea-
sured by the portion of the return that is different than a firm’s anticipated, normal returns. This
may be expressed mathematically as follows:
e=Rit− αi +βiRmtð Þ,
where Rit = return on stock i for day t; Rmt = return on the market portfolio for day t; αi = con-
stant; βi = beta of stock i (measure of non-diversifiable risk).
To calculate parameters α and β, we followed prior research and used a 255 day estimation
period that ends 46 days before the event date. This period reflects 1 year of trading data, which
establishes a general pattern of the firm’s stock price changes relative to the overall stock market.
The value of “e” represents the difference between how the market reacts to the firm and how its
history suggests the market would respond during the same period.2
A common approach in observing abnormal returns is to set the “window” as including both the
event date (i.e., day 0) and 1 day after (i.e., day 1) (Flammer, 2013). This 2-day window approach
captures the immediate investor reaction to the event. Our main analyses used this 2-day (0, 1) win-
dow to capture immediate investor reactions. We also examined 3-day (0, 2) and 4-day (0, 3)
2We should note that our estimation period includes four prior earnings call events. In line with convention in finance, accounting,
and strategy research, we do not drop these earlier events from our estimation sample or adjust our beta estimates to account for prior
events. We believe this is appropriate since including prior earnings events do not necessarily violate the CAPM or factor model
assumptions. Also, announcement information allows the market to update its estimation of a firm’s systematic risk exposure (beta).
Thus, these prior events are important to include in the regression estimation of the firm’s beta. Finally, these events represent a very
small percentage of the observations in our estimation period (about 1.5%), they are unlikely to have a substantive effect on our
results.
PAN ET AL. 2211
windows, and found consistent results. We did not assess stock market reaction prior to the earnings
call because it is unlikely that such managerial communication language would “leak out” in
advance.
3.3 | Independent variables
Our independent variable is the level of concreteness in the top managers’ language in earnings con-
ference call presentations. Extant theory and empirical research about language concreteness from
the linguistics literature, as well as psychology literature guides the development of our measure of
language concreteness. According to this work, concrete language is characterized by the use of
verbs, numbers, and past focused words, while abstract (non-concrete) language is characterized by
adjectives, nonspecific quantifiers, and the use of future-focused words (Elliott, Rennekamp, &
White, 2015; Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Snefjella & Kuperman, 2015). First, research in the linguistics
literature shows that verbs are considered more concrete than adjectives because verbs describe
actions and behaviors that are typically observable and verifiable. In contrast, adjectives are general-
ized descriptions that summarize characteristics across multiple contexts and situations, thus are less
dependent on contextual factors and are more abstract (non-concrete) (Semin et al., 2005; Semin &
Fiedler, 1988). In line with this theory, a rich stream of research has found that listeners perceive
the use of verbs as more concrete, and perceive the use of adjectives as more abstract terms for gen-
eralizing situations, objects, or behaviors (e.g., Assilaméhou, Lepastourel, & Testé, 2013; Maass,
1999; Rubini & Sigall, 2002). Thus, the linguistic literature supports the argument that verbs are
more reflective of concrete language and adjectives are more reflective of abstract language.
Second, research suggests that quantitative numbers such as digits are more specific and con-
crete than nonspecific quantifiers such as “many” or “few” (Jerez-Fernandez, Angulo, & Oppenhei-
mer, 2014; Zhang & Schwarz, 2012). In particular, in an accounting study of firms’ financial
disclosures, Elliott et al. (2015) argued that specific numbers or digits represent concrete language.
Further, Larrimore et al. (2011) argued that specific numbers are “concrete financial details.”
(Larrimore et al., 2011, p. 24).
Finally, research has shown that listeners tend to assess past-focused language as concrete,
because they associate such language to events that have already occurred. In contrast, future-
focused language is speculative, involves conjecture, and cannot be factually vetted by listeners.
Prior work shows individuals describe past events with richer and more specific sensorial detail and
greater specificity regarding time and location than they describe future events (D’Argembeau &
Van der Linden, 2004). Similarly, linguistic examinations of individuals’ social media posts indi-
cate, “past experiences are represented in more detail (higher concreteness) than events that are
listed in the future” (Snefjella & Kuperman, 2015, p. 1455).
We offer two examples to illustrate language that is more and less concrete. A quote from a
General Electric earnings call following an earnings miss was as follows: “We had $77 million of
after tax cost resulting from the termination of two supply arrangements [Italics added].” The lan-
guage in this statement is highly concrete because of its use of past focused words, verbs, and spe-
cific numbers. By contrast, a quote from Abbot Laboratories’ earnings call after an earnings miss
was as follows: “Abbott's high single-digit top line growth, coupled with continued margin expan-
sion will deliver sustainable double-digit ongoing EPS [Italics added].” The language in this state-
ment is more abstract because it uses future-focused words, adjectives, and nonspecific quantifiers.
We derived the measure for concreteness through content analysis of quarterly earnings calls
transcripts using LIWC 2015 (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) software. Content analysis has
been widely used as an important tool to analyze textual data such as press releases, letters to
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shareholders, media coverage, and interview transcripts. Many organization and strategy scholars
have employed this methodology (e.g., Crilly, Hansen, & Zollo, 2016; Gamache, McNamara, Man-
nor, & Johnson, 2015; Love, Lim, & Bednar, 2017). LIWC is a word counting software with built-
in dictionaries which have been demonstrated to be internally reliable and externally valid
(Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007). First, LIWC seeks construct validity by grounding its design
in psychometric theory. Each word category (e.g., verb, past focused) of its built-in dictionaries was
generated by collecting a set of words based on theory and conceptual dimensions. Specifically,
researchers used English dictionaries and psychological measures, such as emotion rating scales, to
develop initial word lists. Then, independent judges used multi-step processes to assess content
validity by examining two criteria: whether words are appropriately included in a category, and
whether categories are discriminant from each other. All categories showed 93% or higher agree-
ment among expert judges (Pennebaker et al., 2007). Second, researchers tested reliability by corre-
lating people’s self-reported responses to LIWC categories (Pennebaker & Francis, 1996).
Depending on different computation methods, reliability alpha is between .55 (using a more conser-
vative method) and .92 (using a method with potential overestimation). This test supports the inter-
nal consistency of LIWC dictionaries (Pennebaker et al., 2007). All categories of words are
standardized as the “base rates of word usage,” which is the ratio of counted words to total number
of words in each sample of content (e.g., a transcript).
Communications and linguistics research suggests that listeners form a general view of language
concreteness by looking at a combination of linguistic elements. Thus, we treat language concrete-
ness as an aggregate (formative) measure. Specifically, we included six LIWC word categories for
our concreteness measure: verbs, adjectives, numbers, nonspecific quantifiers, past-focused, and
future-focused. We then normalized each lexical category score, summed the normalized scores of
concreteness (i.e., verbs, numbers and past-focused words) and subtracted the normalized scores of
abstractness (i.e., adjectives, nonspecific quantifiers, and future-focused words). Thus, we developed
a continuous concreteness-abstractness measure, which has a normal distribution, with a mean of
0.09 and standard deviation of 2.63.3
3.3.1 | Validation of the concrete and abstract language measures
We conducted a validation study drawing on a sample of quotes from our earnings call database.
We asked 20 current managers to assess the degree of concrete and abstract language used in earn-
ings call quotes. We identified a sample top managers’ quotes indicated by our content analysis as
either high or low (about −2 and +2 standard deviations) on each of the dimensions (verbs – adjec-
tives, numbers – quantifiers, and past – future) of our concreteness measure. We identified 10 quotes
for each condition (high in verbs – adjectives, and low in verbs – adjectives, high in numbers –
quantifiers, low in numbers – quantifiers, high in past – future, and low in past – future), resulting
in 60 quotes, which we randomized in order of presentation. Respondents read a short definition of
concrete and non-concrete language.4 Respondents then rated the concreteness of the quotes on a
seven-point scale, with seven representing high concreteness and one representing low concreteness.
Consistent with our expectations, respondents’ assessments of concreteness were significantly higher
for quotes our content analysis rated high rather than low on concreteness. Specifically, we found
that for the numbers-quantifiers dimension, low concreteness quotes received an average rating of
3We did supplementary analyses excluding temporal orientation elements (past-focused words and future-focused words). Our results
are completely consistent with those including temporal orientation elements in the measures.
4We provided the following definition to our respondents: Concrete language reflects the degree to which the words used can provide
specific information or details and offer fairly clear and unambiguous meaning. In contrast, less concrete language uses words that are
less specific and can have multiple interpretations.
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2.81, while high concreteness quotes received an average rating of 6.00, validating this concreteness
dimension (p = .000). We found a similar pattern for the other two dimensions of concreteness. For
the past-future dimension, the high concreteness quotes received an average score of 4.78, while the
low concreteness quotes received an average rating of 2.90 (p = .000). For verbs-adjectives, the
high concreteness quotes received an average score of 4.25, while the low concreteness quotes
received an average rating of 3.67 (p = .000). Taken together, these results provide strong evidence
that the results of our content analysis used in our sample provide a valid measurement of language
concreteness.5
3.4 | Moderators
To test the effect of top managers’ concrete language on investors’ responses under different levels
of risk, we used two common measures to capture firm downside salience: negative earnings sur-
prises (dynamic risk factor) and firms’ financial risk profiles (stable risk factor). We used both a
dynamic and a stable risk factor because investors are likely to interpret managers’ language in light
of both current and longer-term downside elements.
3.4.1 | Earnings surprise
A firm’s earnings surprise is the unexpected deviation of the firm’s performance from the consensus
estimates of analysts (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). When the earnings surprise is negative, the negative
deviation indicates that the firm fell short of expectations. This raises investors' concerns about
whether the longer-term prospects for the firm are lower than previously expected. Thus, investors
that perceive a negative earnings surprise might respond with negative future value assessment of
their investment (Barron et al., 2008; Brown, 2001; Mikhail et al., 2004). In order to measure a
quarterly earnings surprise, we obtained a firm’s earnings surprise using standardized unexpected
earnings (SUE) (Truong & Corrado, 2014). The quarterly SUE measure is defined as the difference
between actual earnings and expected earnings, scaled by the end of quarter stock price. We mea-
sured the consensus expected estimates of earnings as the median of all analysts’ forecasts in the
90-day period prior to the earnings announcement.6
3.4.2 | Financial risk profile
We measured each firm’s financial risk profile using the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. High debt-to-
equity ratios raise downside risk concerns for two reasons. First, when firms are highly leveraged
(have a high debt-to-equity ratio), they have limited access to debt markets to fund strategic invest-
ments. Second, highly leveraged firms must commit a large percentage of their cash flows to paying
off debts. As a result, high debt-to-equity ratios reduce firms’ abilities to generate additional
resources to invest in new opportunities or respond to competitive challenges. This raises the
5In addition to this test, we conducted an additional analysis to confirm our choice of using an aggregate measure of concreteness,
rather than any of the individual dimensions. The literature has argued that aggregate measures should explain variance “equal to or
greater than what is explained by their individual indicators” (Johnson, Rosen, Chang, Djurdjevic, & Taing, 2012: 68). In line with
this condition, we find that a model that includes our composite concrete language variable explains greater variance in our dependent
variable than a model with any one of the individual measures. More specifically, compared to the composite measure, the verbs-
adjectives variable explained 11% less variance of the dependent variable, the numbers-quantifiers variable explained 15% less vari-
ance, and the past-future variable explained 20% less variance. This suggests that the composite measure is adding additional explana-
tory value above any of the individual elements.
6Since investors’ reactions are likely to be heavily influenced by the firm’s current financial performance relative to their expectations,
we want to be sure to partial out the effect of earnings’ surprises when assessing the importance of managers’ language attributes.
Thus, we note that the inclusion of earnings surprise as a hypothesized moderator variable also allows it to serve as a control variable
when examining the effect of language concreteness.
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potential those firms will fall behind competitors who have the financial flexibility to both respond
to opportunities and defend against threats. At extreme levels of leverage, firms will face higher
bankruptcy risk, which is a significant downside risk for shareholders since they are residual claim-
ants to the firms’ assets (Merton, 1974).
3.5 | Control variables
We controlled for additional factors that could influence our dependent variable, including variables
relating to the content of managers’ communication, firm-level variables, and industry-level vari-
ables. First, we controlled for three variables to account for the effects of communication content on
investors’ reactions. Prior studies in finance and accounting suggest that positive and negative com-
munication content in financial disclosures influences investors’ evaluations and reactions
(e.g., Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2012; Feldman, Govindara, Livnat, & Segal, 2010). Accordingly, we
included positive and negative words, as well as words reflecting a firm’s success to capture positive
and negative content in the earnings call transcripts. To capture these, we used LIWC dictionaries
for positive affect, negative affect, and reward.7 Second, we controlled for two firm level factors that
might impact either managers’ language or investors’ responses. We controlled for firm size and
firm performance because they can affect a firm’s ability to influence investors’ reactions to firm
events and firm communication (Hendricks, Singhal, & Zhang, 2009). Firm size was operationalized
as the logarithm of the value of the firm’s total assets. Additionally, we controlled for return on
assets to account for firm performance conditions. Third, to control for variations regarding lan-
guage use across industries, we included 2-digit SIC level industry dummies in our analyses.
4 | ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We standardized all predictors and moderating variables other than language concreteness, which as
mentioned earlier is a sum of standardized measures. We used a Generalized Estimating
Equation model in order to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity in our longitudinal data
(Ballinger, 2004; Liang & Zeger, 1986). GEE is an extension of the generalized linear model and
has several advantages (Hardin & Hilbe, 2003; Stillman, 2003). First, GEE allows us to produce
unbiased estimates for longitudinal data, because the model is robust to conditions in which the
assumption that unobserved firm specific effects are independent of other predictors is violated
(Ballinger, 2004; Krause, Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2015). Second, by specifying the covariance matrix
and link functions, the GEE model produces a beta coefficient that is flexible and robust to error
(McDonald, 1993; Zeger, Liang, & Albert, 1988). As a result, GEE model is widely used to analyze
panel data (Hallen & Pahnke, 2016; Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; Quigley & Ham-
brick, 2012).
We specified our GEE model with Gaussian distribution because our dependent variable (CARs)
is continuous and normally distributed. We specified the identity function as the link function
because we estimated a linear relationship with the untransformed dependent variable. We specified
an exchangeable correlation matrix because we assumed that any two observations within the same
firm are correlated, but the correlation is constant regardless of the temporal distance between the
7In addition to these variables, we also tested language certainty, language tentativeness, and risk-oriented language as potential addi-
tional controls. None of these variables had a substantive effect in any model, nor did they influence the effects of our hypothesized
variables. Thus, for the sake of model parsimony, we did not include these variables in our final analyses.
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observations (Kincaid, 2005). As a robustness check, we also tested our hypotheses using a random
effects model and found consistent results.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for variables included in our models.
Table 2 reports the GEE model results. Model 1 is the baseline model with controls only. Model
2 tests the main effect of language concreteness. Model 3 and model 4 each tests the interactions of
language concreteness with negative earnings surprise and firm financial risk profile, respectively.
Model 5 adds the hypothesized interactions. Model 6 includes a three-way interaction of language
concreteness, earnings surprises, and firm financial risk profiles.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that top managers’ use of concrete language in earnings conference calls
is positively associated with investors’ reactions. As reported by Model 6 in Table 2, concrete lan-
guage is positively associated with investors’ reactions (b = 0.130, p = .001), supporting hypothesis
1. Going from a low level of concrete language (−2 SD) to a high level of concrete language (+2
SD) would result in a return change of about 1.36%. In our sample, firms have an average market
value of just over $13 B, implying that if a firm uses concrete language (+2 SD), it will generate,
on average, a $178 M more favorable market reaction than if it had used abstract language (−2 SD).
Hypothesis 2a predicted that top managers’ use of concrete language will be negatively moder-
ated by the firm’s earnings surprise, with a stronger effect when firms have large negative earnings
surprises. Shown by Model 6 in Table 2, concrete language and earnings surprises had a negative
interaction effect (b = −0.072, p = .020). As we expected, investors reacted more positively to
concrete language when firms faced greater negative earnings surprises but more positively to
abstract language when the firms met their earnings expectations. We further confirmed this result
by plotting the interaction (Figure 1). We find a strong positive effect for concrete language when
firms have large negative earnings surprises. However, such benefits of concrete language erode
as the level of risk decreases. Thus, Hypotheses 2a received support. For firms experiencing a
negative earnings surprise (−1 SD), this finding translates to a CAR increase of 2.10% or about a
$274 M improvement in market value when firm managers use concrete language (+2 SD) as
opposed to abstract language (−2 SD). For firms that exceeded earnings expectations (+1 SD), the
relationship weakens and the use of concrete language results in only a $79 M improvement in
market value, or a 0.60% increase in CARs.
Similarly, for Hypothesis 2b, we posited that the market reaction associated with the level of
concreteness in top managers’ communication will be contingent on the firm’s financial risk profile.
Model 6 shows that the interaction effect between concrete language and financial risk profile is
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Cumulative abnormal returns 0.24 7.39
2 Language concreteness 0.09 2.63 0.02
3 Earnings surprise −0.04 0.35 0.10 −0.03
4 Financial risk profile 0.91 9.22 0.02 0.02 −0.07
5 Firm sizea 8.47 1.69 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 0.05
6 Return on assets 0.05 0.88 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02
7 Positive content 3.17 0.66 0.06 −0.23 0.08 0.02 0.14 −0.05
8 Negative content 0.66 0.32 −0.05 0.04 −0.11 0.00 0.09 −0.04 −0.04
9 Success 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.19 −0.03
Note. N = 6,400.
a We used natural log of total assets.
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positive (b = 0.201, p = .000). As shown in our interaction plot (Figure 2), shareholders react more
positively to concrete language when firms have higher financial risk profiles, but more positively
to abstract language when firms’ financial risk is low. As such, Hypothesis 2b is strongly supported.
For firms whose financial risk profile is high (+1 SD), this finding translates to a CAR increase of
3.40%, or $449 M increase in market value when top managers use concrete language (+2 SD) as
opposed to abstract language (−2 SD). In contrast, for firms with low financial risk profiles
(−1 SD), the use of abstract as opposed to concrete language leads to a 0.73% increase in CAR, or
$95 M increase in market value. These estimates indicate increased benefits associated with using
concrete language when the firm has higher financial risk but also evidence that abstract language
can be beneficial when firm financial risk is low.
4.1 | Supplementary analyses
4.1.1 | An alternative, narrower measure of concreteness
To ensure that our results on concreteness were not solely driven by a managerial focus on past
events, we re-analyzed our transcript data using a concreteness measure that excluded temporal
TABLE 2 GEE model results
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant −0.627 −1.678 −1.655 −1.676 −1.660 −1.667
(.722) (.340) (.344) (.343) (.346) (.347)
Firm size −0.152 −0.139 −0.140 −0.143 −0.143 −0.146
(.025) (.037) (.035) (.034) (.033) (.030)
Return on assets −1.648 −1.429 −1.403 −1.403 −1.386 −1.330
(.127) (.182) (.189) (.190) (.195) (.215)
Positive content 0.595 0.638 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.655
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Negative content −1.069 −0.763 −0.784 −0.739 −0.756 −0.799
(.001) (.017) (.014) (.021) (.018) (.012)
Success 0.252 0.259 0.258 0.268 0.267 0.266
(.010) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language concreteness 0.121 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.130
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Earnings surprise 0.653 0.678 0.685 0.700 0.676
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Financial risk profile 0.146 0.131 0.044 0.041 0.061
(.105) (.148) (.643) (.666) (.520)
Language concreteness × Earnings surprise −0.074 −0.052 −0.072
(.014) (.063) (.020)
Language concreteness × Financial risk profile 0.157 0.145 0.201
(.000) (.001) (.000)
Language concreteness × Earnings
surprise × Financial risk profile
0.071
(.002)
Wald Chi Square 142.57 205.76 211.38 218.73 221.67 231.81
Note: N = 6,400. p-values in parentheses, two-tailed tests for control variables and one-tailed tests for hypothesized variables.
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orientation elements (i.e., past focus and future focus). With this analysis, we found results essen-
tially consistent with those presented in our primary analysis.8
FIGURE 2 Concreteness × Financial risk profile
FIGURE 1 Concreteness × Earnings surprise
8Relatedly, there may be some concern that the performance of the firm may influence the temporal orientation of managers’ lan-
guage. However, we find no evidence that negative earnings lead to a greater focus on the past and less on the future. The correlation
between earnings surprise and past focus is only −0.028, and the correlation between earnings surprise and future focus is −0.005.
Neither of those correlations is high enough to suggest that earnings surprise is related to the temporal focus of top managers’ lan-
guage. Thus, the data suggests that performance relative to expectations does not influence the temporal focus of managers’
communications.
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4.1.2 | A test of a three-way interaction
We argued earlier that abstract language is likely to be of more value when perceived risk is low.
We tested this with 2-way interactions between each of our risk measures and language concrete-
ness. To look further into this issue, we also included a 3-way interaction between language con-
creteness, earnings surprise, and firm financial risk. With this test (reported in Model 6 of Table 2),
we find a strong three-way interaction effect. Specifically, when both earnings surprise and firm
financial risk indicate low risk for the firm, the investors responded more favorably to abstract com-
pared to concrete language (b = 0.071, p = .002). This offers additional support for our general
argument that abstract language can be beneficial in highly favorable situations.
5 | DISCUSSION
The extant literature provides evidence that impression management efforts help create positive firm
images, and prevent and reverse negative firm images. We add to this body of research by examin-
ing the use of persuasive linguistic attributes in top managers’ public communication as a form of
impression management. Building on the communications and linguistics literatures, we explored
whether managers’ use of language attributes in firm communications positively influence investor
reactions. We proposed and found that in the general case, top managers’ use of concrete language
during earnings calls triggers positive investor reactions. In addition, our results further revealed that
concrete language is especially beneficial when the firm faces high downside risk. Hence, our results
demonstrate that using concrete language is an effective persuasion strategy when top managers are
confronted with salient negative information. In addition, however, our findings also provide some
evidence that when downside risk is less salient, abstract (non-concrete) language, rather than con-
crete language is associated with more positive investor reactions. We now turn to the theoretical
and practical implications of our findings.
We broadly add to the impression management literature by demonstrating that it is not just
the content of communication that holds potential in effectively managing the impressions of audi-
ences. We find that subtle language cues embedded in the linguistic style of managers also have
an impact on audience members’ responses. Specifically, we develop and test theory about an
important persuasive language attribute, language concreteness embedded in top managers’ com-
munication. Concrete language constitutes a distinct form of linguistic strategy that can induce
audiences’ positive reactions by providing details and context-specific information. The communi-
cations literature shows that this approach increases listeners’ ease of processing, minimizes cog-
nitive burden and stress, and enhances perceptions of speakers’ persuasiveness (Hansen & Wänke,
2010; Larrimore et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2007). Consistent with this prior work, we found that
managers’ use of concrete language in earnings calls enhances investors’ subsequent reactions.
Our findings are novel as they reveal that managers’ use of subtle language attributes embedded
in corporate communications can meaningfully impact how audience members’ respond to those
messages.
Although we focused our examination on language attributes in earnings calls, the use of con-
crete language by CEOs likely matters in various other management contexts. Our results suggest
the benefits of concrete language are particularly important in situations in which negative informa-
tion is salient and uncertainty heightened. Prior communications work shows the use of concrete
language builds confidence in speaker expertise and trustworthiness (Larrimore et al., 2011; Miller
et al., 2007). Conversely, the use of abstract language may be beneficial in situations in which man-
agerial expertise and trust are established. Thus, future research should examine interactions top
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managers have with a range of stakeholders under varying conditions to examine whether the value
of abstract vs. concrete language differs across these settings. For example, future research could
examine the influence of language in the boardroom. In firms with longstanding CEOs and stable
board membership, directors may have confidence in the expertise and trustworthiness of the CEO.
Under such situations, CEOs may benefit by adapting the language attributes they use to reflect the
higher credibility they have with those board members. However, the relationship may change in sit-
uations where the CEO is new and is a firm outsider, or when there has been significant change in
board membership. Additionally, in interactions with investors, the benefits of concrete and abstract
language may differ based on firm characteristics that influence the uncertainty of firm assessments,
such as whether the firm is established or new and unproven, or if the market is facing a technologi-
cal or market discontinuity. Overall, our findings suggest the effectiveness of language concreteness
is complex and conditional on the informational environment of the firm. Further work should more
carefully explore the contingencies that drive language attribute effectiveness.
Our research raises other interesting questions about the influence of language attributes. One
potential extension of our findings is to examine the influence of linguistic attributes in conjunction
with previously discussed impression management categories. For instance, prior work has been
conducted on: (a) apologies—in which speakers accept responsibility for negative events,
(b) excuses—in which speakers deny responsibility for negative behavior or outcomes, and
(c) justifications—in which speakers accept responsibility for negative outcomes but not their nega-
tive implications (Bolino et al., 2008). Given the effectiveness of concreteness under more negative
conditions, we would expect that managers would receive better responses in using concreteness
under conditions in which managers’ attempt to “minimize bad” through apologies, excuses, and
justifications (e.g., Bolino et al., 2008). However, it is unclear whether the value of using concrete
language differs across these three forms of impression management content techniques. Thus,
results from this study suggest a complementary approach for future research in which both the con-
tent of communication and language attributes embedded in communication are jointly considered
to yield a more nuanced understanding of language as a means to manage impressions.
The current study constitutes an initial step in examining the impression management implica-
tions of language attributes in top managers’ communication. Another interesting set of questions
triggered by this study concern the processes by which language attributes are selected or emerge.
While results from this study show that concrete language is typically beneficial, we do not know to
what degree this language is intentional. Do some CEOs better understand the association between
language attributes and market reactions? If so, how is this understanding developed? Hence, while
we examined the consequences of using language attributes, we do not yet understand the conditions
under which or the reasons why CEOs use specific language attributes. Thus, while our work
showed consequences associated with the use of language attributes, future work may benefit from
an exploration of language attribute antecedents.
Communications and linguistics theory should stimulate further work on impression manage-
ment. This literature allowed us to discover the important, yet unexplored influence of language
attributes. Further exploration of the communications and linguistics literature suggests other lan-
guage influences that may influence impression management practices and outcomes. We previously
discussed the general communication areas of phonology, syntax, and lexicon, and each area likely
provides fertile ground for subsequent work, as CEOs may use the sound of words, word order, and
word choice for more effective communication. Although we clearly encourage work in these areas,
research in the communications literature points to an additional previously unmentioned area that
might enhance our understanding of impression management effectiveness: language imagery
(Emrich, Brower, Feldman, & Garland, 2001; Taylor & Thompson, 1982). Language imagery
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consists of objects, actions, and ideas that are represented to appeal to the physical senses of the lis-
tener. For example, effective speakers frequently use sense of smell, sight, taste, touch, or hearing in
their imagery, often with simile or metaphor. Thus, the communications and linguistics literatures
hint at multiple avenues by which to further explore impression management in communications.
Finally, this study has implications for managers. By delving into a particular persuasive lan-
guage attribute, our study suggests that top managers should be conscious of the influence of lan-
guage and be mindful when designing their linguistic strategy for managing investor impressions
because, while the benefits of concrete language appear broad, outcomes still depend on levels of
firm risk. Thus, it makes financial sense for managers to consult with their public relations profes-
sionals in order to best manage stakeholders’ impressions in high-risk or other negative situations
through the intentional use of language attributes. Under such negative conditions, firms truly appear
to benefit most when their CEOs “tell it to us straight.”
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